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dc.contributor.authorDe Fraja, Gianni
dc.contributor.authorSákovics, József
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-27T14:25:21Z
dc.date.available2012-04-27T14:25:21Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10943/215
dc.description.abstractIn many decentralised markets, the traders who benefit most from an exchange do not employ intermediaries even though they could easily afford them. At the same time, employing intermediaries is not worthwhile for traders who benefit little from trade. Together, these decisions amount to non-monotone participation choices in intermediation: only traders of middle “type” employ intermediaries, while the rest, the high and the low types, prefer to search for a trading partner directly. We provide a theoretical foundation for this, hitherto unexplained, phenomenon. We build a dynamic matching model, where a trader’s equilibrium bargaining share is a convex increasing function of her type. We also show that this is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of non-monotone equilibria.en_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Edinburghen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSIRE DISCUSSION PAPER;SIRE-DP-2010-84
dc.subjectTwo-sided marketsen_US
dc.subjectintermediationen_US
dc.subjectdynamic matchingen_US
dc.titleExclusive Nightclubs and Lonely Hearts Columns: Nonmonotone Participation in Optional Intermediationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US


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