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dc.contributor.authorChatterji, Shurojit
dc.contributor.authorGhosal, Sayantan
dc.description.abstractBank crises, by interrupting liquidity provision, have been viewed as resulting in welfare losses. In a model of banking with moral hazard, we show that second best bank contracts that improve on autarky ex ante require costly crises to occur with positive probability at the interim stage. When bank payoffs are partially appropriable, either directly via imposition of fines or indirectly by the use of bank equity as a collateral, we argue that an appropriately designed ex-ante regime of policy intervention involving conditional monitoring can prevent bank crises.en
dc.publisherUniversity of Glasgowen
dc.publisherSingapore Management Universityen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSIRE DISCUSSION PAPER;SIRE-DP-2013-85
dc.subjectbank runsen
dc.subjectmoral hazarden
dc.titleLiquidity, moral hazard and bank crisesen
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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